Vaccines for Pandemic Influenza by Luke, Catherine J. & Subbarao, Kanta
Recent outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza
in Asia and associated human infections have led to a
heightened level of awareness and preparation for a possi-
ble influenza pandemic. Vaccination is the best option by
which spread of a pandemic virus could be prevented and
severity of disease reduced. Production of live attenuated
and inactivated vaccine seed viruses against avian influen-
za viruses, which have the potential to cause pandemics,
and their testing in preclinical studies and clinical trials will
establish the principles and ensure manufacturing experi-
ence that will be critical in the event of the emergence of
such a virus into the human population. Studies of such
vaccines will also add to our understanding of the biology
of avian influenza viruses and their behavior in mammalian
hosts. 
I
nfluenza is a negative-strand RNA virus that belongs to
the family Orthomyxoviridae, which consists of 4 gen-
era: influenza A, influenza B, influenza C, and Thogoto
viruses. The proteins of influenza Aare encoded on 8 RNA
gene segments.  Influenza A viruses are widely distrib-
uted in nature and can infect a wide variety of birds and
mammals. Influenza A virus subtypes are classified on the
basis of the antigenicity of their surface glycoproteins,
hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA); 16 HA and
9 NA subtypes are known to exist, and all of them infect
aquatic birds. Most infections in waterfowl are not associ-
ated with clinical disease. Relatively few subtypes of
influenza Aviruses have caused sustained outbreaks of dis-
ease in the human population. Influenza A viruses of the
H1, H2, and H3 HA and of the N1 and N2 NA subtypes
have circulated in the human population in the 20th centu-
ry. H1N1 viruses appeared in 1918 and circulated until
1957, when they were replaced by H2N2 viruses. H3N2
viruses appeared in 1968, replacing H2N2 viruses, and
have remained in circulation in the human population.
H1N1 viruses reappeared in the human population in 1977
and continue to cocirculate with H3N2 viruses (1).
Currently, influenza epidemics in the winter are caused by
H3N2 and H1N1 influenza A and influenza B viruses. 
Influenza Pandemics
In addition to seasonal influenza epidemics, influenza
pandemics have occurred periodically. An influenza pan-
demic occurs when an influenza strain with a novel HA
subtype (with or without a novel NA subtype) appears and
spreads in the human population, which has little or no
immunity to the novel HA. In the 20th century, pandemics
occurred in 1918, 1957, and 1968 and were associated with
substantial illness and death. The pandemic of 1918, the
“Spanish flu,” was caused by an influenza A virus of the
H1N1 subtype and was responsible for >40 million deaths
worldwide (2). In the Asian influenza pandemic of 1957, in
which H2N2 viruses appeared, influenza-associated excess
deaths were estimated at >2 million worldwide (3). The
influenza pandemic of 1968 started in Hong Kong and was
caused by an H3N2 virus. The 1968 pandemic virus had
the same NAas the H2N2 virus it replaced but a novel HA.
This pandemic was much less severe than the previous
pandemics, with estimated influenza-associated excess
deaths of ≈1 million (3). Preexisting immunity to the N2
NA of the 1968 pandemic influenza virus may partially
explain why this pandemic was less severe than the 2 pre-
ceding pandemics, although the availability of penicillins
and macrolides may also have contributed.
We cannot predict when the next influenza pandemic
will occur, or which influenza virus subtype will cause it.
Forecasts of the severity of the next influenza pandemic
differ in their predictions of deaths based on the models
used. Modeling based on the pandemic of 1968 projects 2
million–7.4 million excess deaths worldwide (3). Meltzer
and colleagues have estimated that, in the absence of effec-
tive interventions, in the United States alone, the next
influenza pandemic could cause 89,000–207,000 excess
deaths and 314,000–734,000 hospitalizations, as well as
tens of millions of outpatient visits and additional illness-
es (4). In this scenario, the economic impact of an influen-
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deaths, illness, and hospitalizations in the United States
alone, excluding disruptions to commerce and society,
would be $71.3–$166.5 billion (4). 
In the recent H5N1 outbreaks in Asia, >120 million
birds died or were culled during a 3-month period (3). For
the countries of Thailand and Vietnam, the estimated
decreases in gross domestic product (GDP) resulting from
poultry farming losses are $1.2 and $0.3 billion, respec-
tively, with a total estimated loss in GDPfor Asia of $10 to
$15 billion, according to the same source. In addition to
the effects on local poultry production and commerce,
international trade and travel would undoubtedly suffer in
an influenza pandemic. 
Avian Species as a Reservoir for 
Pandemic Influenza Viruses
Aquatic birds are the reservoir for all known subtypes
of influenza Aviruses, and as such are the pool from which
pandemic influenza viruses arise. Avian influenza (AI)
viruses are introduced into the human population after
reassortment with circulating human influenza Aviruses or
by directly infecting humans. 
Until 1997, it was widely believed that to infect humans
an AI virus would have to undergo reassortment with a
human influenza virus in an intermediate mammalian
species to acquire the necessary characteristics for efficient
transmission to and replication in humans. In the last 10
years, direct transmission of AI viruses from birds to
humans has been reported on several occasions, causing a
wide spectrum of disease, ranging from mild febrile and
respiratory illness in some H5 and H9N2 infections, con-
junctivitis in the case of H7 influenza infections, to severe
disease and death, as seen in the current H5N1 outbreak in
Asia. The details of these cases are given in Table 1.
The gene segments of the influenza viruses isolated
from the human H5N1 patients in 1997 were all derived
from AI viruses, with no evidence of reassortment with
human influenza viruses. Surveillance studies in birds in
Hong Kong showed that H5N1 and H9N2 AI viruses cocir-
culated in poultry markets in Hong Kong at the time of the
1997 H5N1 AI outbreak, creating favorable conditions for
reassortment (16). H9N2 AI viruses had become wide-
spread in domestic chickens in Asia since 1990. In addi-
tion, both of these AI subtypes were isolated from ducks
and geese in the region, suggesting a wide distribution in
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hypothesis that the H5N1 Hong Kong viruses acquired
their HA gene from an A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-like
(H5N1) virus and the gene encoding NA from an
A/teal/Hong Kong/W312/97 (H6N1)-like virus circulating
in terrestrial poultry. Data also suggested that H9N2 or
H6N1 AI viruses circulating in the region were the likely
source of the internal protein genes (17–20). H9N2 virus-
es continue to circulate in birds in southern China. 
The outbreak of human H5N1 cases in 1997 ended with
the depopulation of the poultry markets in Hong Kong.
These actions may have averted an influenza pandemic
(16). Precursor viruses, however, continued to circulate in
the region, and in 2003, highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses
reemerged, and new human infections were identified and
continue to be reported to date. 
Preparing for the Next Pandemic
The reemergence of highly pathogenic H5N1 AI virus-
es in Asia has raised concerns of a potential pandemic,
resulting in an augmented level of preparedness for such
an eventuality. The pandemic preparedness plan for the
United States was published in November 2005 (www.hhs.
gov/pandemicflu/plan/). 
Two intervention strategies could prevent or lessen the
severity of an emergent influenza pandemic, vaccination
and use of antiviral drugs. The use of antiviral compounds
is discussed in another article in this issue (21). We focus
on the challenges facing development of pandemic
influenza vaccines and how we can prepare and test a
library of vaccine seed viruses. Although the next influen-
za pandemic could possibly be caused by a different avian
or reassortant virus than the highly pathogenic H5N1 AI
virus now circulating in Asia, current vaccine development
activities are largely focused on viruses of this subtype.
Events in Asia underscore the urgent need for generating
candidate H5N1 vaccines and evaluating them in humans,
but ignoring AI viruses of the other subtypes would be
imprudent. All AI viruses are presumed to have pandemic
potential. 
Developing Vaccines for Pandemic Influenza 
Central to pandemic preparedness planning are effec-
tive vaccines to thwart the spread of a pandemic virus and
to prevent illness and death associated with a novel viru-
lent strain. The principle behind the generation of human
influenza vaccines is to elicit protective antibodies direct-
ed primarily against HA, the major protective antigen of
the virus that induces neutralizing antibodies. Although
major advances in our understanding of the biology and
ecology of the H5N1 AI viruses have been made since
human infections were first reported in 1997, and we have
many years of experience and much accumulated knowl-
edge about immunity to human influenza viruses, gaps
remain in our understanding of immunity to AI viruses
(Table 2). Filling in these gaps is vital to developing vac-
cines to protect the human population. Studies using inac-
tivated vaccines against H9N2 and H5 subtypes of AI or
purified recombinant H5 HA have demonstrated that these
vaccines are poorly immunogenic in comparison to epi-
demic human influenza strains of the H1N1 and H3N2
subtypes. For example, inactivated vaccines against avian
influenza subtypes require 2 doses and administration with
adjuvant to achieve the desired level of neutralizing anti-
body (22–27) (Table 3). The precise antigenic properties of
a nascent pandemic strain cannot be predicted, so available
vaccines may be poorly antigenically matched to the pan-
demic virus. Practical considerations and hurdles for pan-
demic influenza vaccine development also have to be
overcome. Manufacturing capacity, the ability of candidate
vaccine strains to grow well in eggs, and biological safety
containment of parent strains for vaccine development are
all problems to be addressed. In addition, the most vulner-
able sections of the population may not be the same as
those seen with yearly influenza epidemics, making plan-
ning to target certain population groups for vaccination
difficult at best. For these reasons, the time before the next
pandemic must be used judiciously for developing and
clinically testing candidate vaccines.
Generating Vaccine Seed Viruses 
The interpandemic period must be used to explore the
optimal scientific, manufacturing, regulatory, and clinical
research strategies for developing vaccines that are effec-
tive against pandemic influenza so that a vaccine will be
available as soon as possible in the event of a pandemic. To
this end, the Laboratory of Infectious Diseases, National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID),
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gram to develop candidate vaccines to prevent influenza
pandemics caused by AI viruses. The vaccine seed viruses
to be generated are based on the live attenuated cold-adapt-
ed influenza virus vaccines developed by Maassab and col-
leagues at the University of Michigan in the 1960s (28)
and used as the basis for the FluMist vaccine
(MedImmune, Inc., Gaithersburg, MD, USA) now
licensed in the United States for persons 5–49 years of age
for preventing interpandemic influenza. The principles of
the development of such vaccines and safety and efficacy
studies conducted in humans are reviewed elsewhere
(29,30). The vaccine seed virus development strategy is
not exclusive to live, attenuated vaccines, and similar stud-
ies with inactivated vaccines against different AI subtypes
should be initiated.  
The goal of our research program is to establish the
“proof of principle” that the A/AA/6/60 cold-adapted (AA
ca) virus bearing AI virus HA and NA genes will be infec-
tious, immunogenic, and safe in humans and therefore of
potential use for controlling pandemic influenza. The
observed efficacy of live, attenuated vaccines for human
interpandemic influenza, together with the findings to date
that inactivated or subunit AI vaccines are suboptimally
immunogenic in humans, strongly suggests that using live
vaccines against pandemic influenza is worth exploring.
Live, attenuated AI vaccines might require fewer doses
and might provide broader immune responses than inacti-
vated or subunit vaccines.
Live, attenuated influenza Acandidate vaccines bearing
the 6 internal genes of the AAca donor virus (the attenuat-
ing genes) and the 2 protective HA and NA genes from
human H3 or H1 viruses have been studied extensively in
humans and have been licensed for general use. These vac-
cines are safe, infectious, immunogenic, nontransmissible,
genetically stable, and efficacious (reviewed in [30]). It is
reasonable to propose that a live, attenuated vaccine would
rapidly induce protective immune responses, but this
requires experimental verification in humans. 
The pandemic influenza vaccine candidates will be
generated by plasmid-based reverse genetics, shown in the
Figure, panel A (reviewed in [31]). This technique allows
infectious virus to be recovered from cells approved for
use in human vaccine development (so-called qualified
cells). These cells are cotransfected with plasmids encod-
ing each of the 8 influenza gene segments to generate
recombinant viruses that contain the HA and NA genes
from AI viruses and 6 internal gene segments from the AA
ca virus (31). Reverse genetics will allow modification of
known virulence motifs in the HAor NAgenes, such as the
removal of the multibasic amino acid cleavage site motif in
the HA gene of highly pathogenic AI strains that is associ-
ated with virulence in birds (32). The other advantage of
reverse genetics is that a selection system is not needed to
derive appropriate reassortant viruses from a background
of parental viruses. In addition, the plasmids encoding the
genes from the attenuated vaccine donor strain are avail-
able, and only the HA and NA genes need to be cloned for
each vaccine. Several H5N1 vaccine candidates have been
developed by using this technique (33–36). Some potential
obstacles to applying the reverse genetics approach
include the need for qualified cells for virus production
and intellectual property for this technique. However, as
long as the HA and NA gene segments do not have to be
modified, the 6-2 gene reassortant investigational pandem-
ic vaccines can be generated by genetic reassortment, as
shown in the Figure, panel B. A candidate H9N2 pandem-
ic vaccine was generated by using this technique (37).
Live, attenuated vaccines must be able to replicate to
levels that elicit a protective immune response without
causing disease in the host, so a balance of infectivity,
level of attenuation, and immunogenicity must be
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evaluate in humans the safety, infectivity, immunogenicity,
and phenotypic stability of live, attenuated influenza A
candidate vaccines. The types of in vitro and in vivo stud-
ies that will be performed before clinical trials in humans
are initiated, in addition to standard safety tests, are listed
in Table 4. In vitro studies will be performed to confirm the
genome sequence of the vaccine viruses. The cold-adapted
and temperature-sensitive phenotype of the vaccine virus-
es will be confirmed in vitro in tissue culture. The attenu-
ation phenotype of the vaccine candidates must be tested in
an appropriate animal model. A critical step in evaluating
vaccine candidates is selecting a model in which restriction
of replication of the vaccine virus can be convincingly
demonstrated in comparison to the wild-type parent virus.
Since we cannot predict how AI viruses of different sub-
types will behave in different animal species, animal mod-
els for each virus subtype will be developed. The use of
rodent models (e.g., mice and hamsters) will be explored.
The use of a ferret model will be investigated as well,
although limited availability of influenza-seronegative fer-
rets and facilities in which highly pathogenic wild-type AI
viruses can be evaluated in ferrets makes such studies
logistically and practically difficult for assessing large
numbers of candidate vaccines. In addition, the higher
body temperature of the ferret may confound interpretation
of studies in which replication of temperature-sensitive
viruses is being assessed. The vaccine viruses may also
require evaluation in the standard Office International des
Épizooties (World Organization for Animal Health) intra-
venous pathogenicity test in chickens to confirm that they
are not highly pathogenic in chickens and, as such, do not
pose a threat to the poultry industry. Such a requirement
will be guided by national agricultural authorities.
Immunogenicity, dose response, antibody response kinet-
ics, and efficacy studies will also be carried out in appro-
priate animal models before clinical trials. 
Past experience with live, attenuated vaccines for inter-
pandemic human influenza (30) indicates that live virus
vaccines may have great potential for use as vaccines dur-
ing pandemic spread of influenza because of their high
level of immunogenicity for immunologically naive per-
sons and their ability to rapidly induce immunity, i.e.,
within the first 10 days after vaccination. The contribution
of cellular immune responses to the control of AI virus
infection remains to be determined and can be examined in
the context of live, attenuated vaccines. Such responses
may be valuable in an influenza pandemic, in which the
vaccine may protect from severe illness or death even if it
is not completely antigenically matched to the emergent
strain. Since a live, attenuated virus vaccine based on the
AAca donor virus has been licensed by the Food and Drug
Administration for general use in healthy persons 5–49
years of age, the infrastructure for manufacture and char-
acterization of live, attenuated virus vaccines exists. The
availability of the manufacturing capability for a live,
attenuated virus vaccine makes it feasible to initiate a proj-
ect in collaboration with industry to develop seed viruses
for live, attenuated vaccines against influenza A viruses
with pandemic potential. 
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Figure. A) The 8-plasmid reverse genetics system to generate
recombinant, live, attenuated pandemic influenza vaccines. Six
plasmids encoding the internal genes of the attenuated donor virus
are mixed with 2 plasmids encoding the circulating avian virus
hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes (which may or
may not have been modified to remove virulence motifs). Qualified
cells are transfected with the plasmids, and the attenuated reas-
sortant virus is isolated. B). Generation of live, attenuated pan-
demic influenza vaccine viruses with the 6 internal genes from the
attenuated donor virus bearing attenuating mutations (*) and the
HA and NA genes from the circulating avian virus by classical
reassortment. The 6-2 reassortants generated by this method are
selected in the presence of antiserum specific for HAand NAof the
attenuated donor virus.Our overall plan includes the following steps: 1) gener-
ation of a set of live, attenuated viruses bearing an
H4–H16 HAand the accompanying NAfound in the wild-
type virus (we will not generate novel combinations of HA
and NA proteins) on the attenuated AA ca donor virus
background; 2) preparation and qualification of a clinical
lot of each pandemic vaccine candidate; 3) evaluation of
the safety, infectivity, immunogenicity, and phenotypic
stability of each candidate vaccine in humans; 4) storage of
human sera obtained from vaccinees to determine anti-
genic relatedness of the vaccine administered to the study
participant with actual newly emerged pandemic viruses;
and 5) storage of seed viruses for manufacture of vaccine
to prevent disease caused by pandemic viruses that do
emerge. Thus, vaccine manufacture can be initiated with
pretested viruses without delay. Even if the seed virus does
not match the pandemic strain and a vaccine virus that is
an exact match has to be generated, the dosing and
immunogenicity data from the previous vaccine studies
can guide its use. If the AA ca reassortant virus is safe and
attenuated but infectious in humans, it can be used as a
challenge virus to assess vaccine efficacy for both live and
inactivated influenza virus vaccines. 
A major concern associated with using a live, attenuat-
ed influenza vaccine bearing genes derived from an AI
virus is the risk for reassortment of the vaccine virus with
a circulating influenza virus. This reassortment could
result in a novel subtype of influenza that could spread in
the human population. Although such an event may not be
of concern in the face of widespread disease from a pan-
demic strain of influenza, it would clearly be an unfavor-
able outcome if the threatened pandemic did not
materialize. Clinical trials in humans of these live, attenu-
ated pandemic vaccine candidates will be performed in
carefully planned and executed inpatient studies. The risk
for reassortment must be carefully considered by public
health authorities before a decision is made to introduce a
live, attenuated vaccine in a threatened pandemic. Using
every available option to develop vaccines that may be
used for an influenza pandemic is critical. 
Conclusions
Recent events in Asia have led to intensive planning
and preparation for a potential global influenza pandemic.
Vaccine development is a critical part of preparedness.
Recent studies that used mathematical models to study
potential intervention strategies predicted that local pre-
vaccination with a vaccine that is 70% efficacious against
the pandemic strain could enhance the effectiveness of
antiviral prophylaxis in preventing spread of the virus (38).
Production and establishment of the proof of principle of
candidate live and inactivated vaccines with AI HA and
NA proteins in the interpandemic period could save valu-
able time in the event of a pandemic. Such studies will also
provide information about the biology of AI viruses and
immune responses to them in humans. 
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